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How is it that “sincerity itself is bullshit”?   
 
It is fortunate that Harry Frankfurt is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Princeton 
University, for it is difficult to imagine how anyone but the likes of him could 
publish a book thus titled with the likes of Princeton University Press.  To be true, in 
my teaching of the skills associated with thinking critically and while spewing forth 
my own rendition of this genre, I have often been stumped in my search for a more 
genteel term.  Humbug?  Or any of its synonyms proposed by Max Black and cited 
by Frankfurt: balderdash, claptrap, hokum, drivel, buncombe, imposture, and quackery 
(1985, p. 5)?  None, you will agree, quite captures or expresses what bullshit does.  
They are little more than “quaint equivalents [that are] not very helpful” (ibid.) 
Perhaps it is because bullshit is without peer as a concept that Frankfurt has 
seen fit to publish such a careful conceptual analysis of it – and within austerely 
black cloth covers whose severity is ironically contrasted with the 67 very small 
pages within – but this is part of the humour that lies just beneath.  It is a very 
serious book and a very funny book.  Very short too, and with a keen sense of 
respect I have taken care to ensure that this review is indeed shorter than the book. 
This book’s topic is of course not the first in the field that may be an affront to 
some.  Neil Postman’s paper, “Bullshit and the art of crap-detection” (1969), comes 
first to mind.  There Postman argued that our key task, both as philosophers and 
educators, is to be on the lookout for and to identify bullshit, and to educate our 
students in such a manner that they might do the same.  For Postman, bullshit is 
associated with pomposity, bigotry, inanity (by which he means “ignorance 
presented in the cloak of sincerity” [p. 4]), and superstition (by which he means 
“ignorance presented in the cloak of authority” [ibid.]).  Crap-detection is, well, just 
that, a phrase he attributes to Ernest Hemingway, who responded when asked about 
the most important quality a writer can have, “A built-in, shock-proof, crap 
detector” (p. 1).   
Hannah Arendt addressed the issue of lying in politics in her 1973 essay of 
that title.  “Truthfulness,” she suggested, “has never been counted among the 
political virtues, and lies have always been regarded as justifiable tools in political 
dealings.  Whoever reflects on these matters can only be surprised by how little 
attention has been paid, in our tradition of philosophical and political thought, to 
their significance, on the one hand for the nature of action and, on the other, for the 
nature of our ability to deny in thought and word whatever happens to be the case 
(Arendt, 1973, p. 10)”.  Frankfurt makes no reference to Arendt, or to Postman, 
however.  His literature review is, like his book, short. 
  On Bullshit is made up of just those 67 pages, at about 100 words a page.  
Since I am currently a denizen of greater China, I was reminded of its similarity – in 
size only, for there their common features most certainly end – to Mao’s Little Red 
Book.  And I began to wonder how much less suffering there might have been in the 
Cultural Revolution had the Red Guards been able to absorb the contents of On 
Bullshit with the same diligence with which they appear to have clutched their 
copies of Mao’s tomette.  I also began to wonder whether the world might have been 
spared another four years of George W. Bush had more of the denizens of the Land 
of the Free, Home of the Brave been able to see through the Machiavellian bullshit of 
Karl Rove with the help of this marvellous little book.  Fortunately for Tony Blair not 
more of the British electorate read it prior to that country’s recent election.  How else 
could we explain that Alastair Campbell was once again successful in spinning 
Labour into its third term? 
Frankfurt has written the book not only because of bullshit’s peerlessness, but 
because it is so ubiquitous.  “One of the most salient features of our culture,” he 
claims in his opening sentence, “is that there is so much bullshit.”  We all know this; 
we take it for granted.  We have consequently not thought about it very carefully or 
systematically.  The problem, “in other words, [is that] we have no theory” of 
bullshit (p. 1).  Frankfurt’s aim is “to begin the development of a theoretical 
understanding of bullshit, mainly by providing some tentative and exploratory 
philosophical analysis” (pp. 1-2).  It is a very serious and careful analysis that he 
provides.  Heavyweights such as Saint Augustine and Wittgenstein are marshalled 
to this end.  Augustine’s distinction of eight types of lies in his essay “Lying” does 
sterling duty.  Wittgenstein’s contribution comes not from the Tractatus but from his 
reported rebuke to a friend, Pascal, who, having just had her tonsils out, sorrily 
croaks that she feels “just like a dog that has been run over” (p. 24).  “Bullshit,” 
thinks Wittgenstein (suggests Frankfurt), “You don’t know what a dog that has been 
run over feels like” (ibid.).  While Pascal, continues Frankfurt, surely “does know 
something about the quality of the feeling to which the phrase [‘the feeling of a run-
over dog’] refers: she knows at least that it is an undesirable and unenjoyable feeling, 
a bad feeling, … hers is not just any bad feeling but, according to her account, the 
distinctive kind of bad feeling that a dog has when it is run over” (pp. 28-9).  To 
Wittgenstein, this is “unconnected to a concern with the truth, … not germane to the 
enterprise of describing reality” (p. 30) – it is “just bullshit” (p. 29).  Key to 
Frankfurt’s conceptual analysis is that Pascal is not lying: “she does not presume that 
she knows the truth, and therefore she cannot be deliberately promulgating a 
proposition that she presumes to be false” (p. 33).  What she is guilty of is this “lack 
of connection to a concern with truth – this indifference to how things really are” (pp. 
33-4).  This, for Frankfurt, is “the essence of bullshit” (ibid.). 
Where the likes of Karl Rove and Alastair Campbell are concerned, it is a 
deliberate, rather than a careless, indifference to how things really are.  How else 
should we understand the “sexing-up” of intelligence dossiers to include claims of 
Saddam Hussein’s 45-minute battle readiness with chemical warheads on the 
evidence of one opposition fugitive?  Rove and Campbell are not credited with so 
much as a mention in the book, but they and their kind are its chief target: “The 
realms of advertising and of public relations, and the nowadays closely related realm 
of politics, are replete with instances of bullshit so unmitigated that they can serve 
among the most indisputable and classic paradigms of the concept” (p. 22).  The 
“craftsmen” responsible for this bullshit are indeed “exquisitely sophisticated”, 
“dedicating themselves tirelessly to getting every word and image they produce 
exactly right” (p. 23).   
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There is, admits Frankfurt, in this notion of “carefully wrought bullshit” a 
“certain inner strain” (p. 22): “Excrement is”, after all, “not designed or crafted at all; 
it is merely emitted, or dumped.  It may have a more or less coherent shape, or it 
may not, but it is in any case certainly not wrought” (pp. 21-2).  This paradox, this 
“inner strain” in the idea of “carefully wrought bullshit”, we can understand in the 
light of the deliberateness of the indifference to how things really are that is the 
hallmark of the spin doctor and other purveyors of snake oil.  The “mode of laxity” 
(p. 23) pertinent to both the excreter and the bullshitter doing it at your front door is 
that they are both “trying to get away with something” (p. 23).  A careless lack of 
connection to a concern with truth this is not. 
Why the incidence of bullshit appears so great today Frankfurt addresses by 
considering who might display such carelessness.  First, it’s those whose 
“obligations or opportunities to speak about some topic exceed [their] knowledge of 
the facts that are relevant to that topic”, a “discrepancy common in public life, where 
people are frequently impelled – whether by their own propensities or by the 
demands of others – to speak extensively about matters of which they are to some 
degree ignorant” (p. 63).  Naturally I couldn’t help thinking also of those of us in the 
academy.  Second, it’s those who believe that it is their responsibility as citizens of 
information-saturated democracies “to have opinions about everything” (p. 64).  
Worse, “the lack of any significant connection between a person’s opinions and his 
apprehension of reality will be even more severe … for someone who believes it is 
his responsibility, as a conscientious moral agent, to evaluate events and conditions 
in all parts of the world” (ibid.). 
But those for whom Frankfurt reserves his well veiled invective in the book’s 
closing pages are those who, in keeping with the intellectual climate of the last few 
decades, “deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality” (p. 64).  
Both the liar and the truth-teller assume “that there are indeed facts that are in some 
way both determinate and knowable” (p. 61).  But while the liar and the truth-teller 
both recognize the authority of the truth (the liar simply defies it by refusing to meet 
its demands), the bullshitter “ignores these demands altogether” (p. 61).  The 
bullshitter, as “someone who ceases to believe in the possibility of identifying certain 
statements as true and others as false” (ibid.) is therefore “a greater enemy of the 
truth” (ibid.) than is the liar.  With the less mature postmoderns in his sights (for him 
they are clearly no better than the likes of Campbell or Rove), Frankfurt disparages 
those who have undermined “confidence in the value of disinterested efforts to 
determine what is true and what is false, and even in the intelligibility of the notion 
of objective inquiry” (p. 65). 
One response to this loss of confidence, he suggests, has been a retreat from a 
“dedication to the ideal of correctness” (p. 65) to the pursuit of sincerity as an 
epistemological ideal.  Here he echoes Charles Taylor’s lamenting the contemporary 
predilection for imbuing a conviction with significance simply because it has been 
authentically reached: “My view is worthwhile because it is mine”.  While Taylor is 
concerned to show that moral conclusions reached by an individual without regard 
to her “horizons of significance” (1991, p. 37) are ultimately hollow, he parallels 
Frankfurt’s epistemological concerns.  For the latter, “since it makes no sense [to the 
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sceptic] to try to be true to the facts, he must therefore try instead to be true to 
himself” (p. 66). 
But while Frankfurt shares Taylor’s rejection of such radical individualism 
(authenticity for Taylor is to be sought in a communitarian approach to ethics, after 
all) he will have nothing to do with any mention of authenticity or sincerity in the 
sense of trying to be true to one’s nature as if it were a determinate and knowable 
entity: “It is preposterous to imagine that we ourselves are determinate, and hence 
susceptible both to correct and to incorrect descriptions, while supposing that the 
ascription of determinacy to anything else has been exposed as a mistake” (p. 66).  
“Our natures are,” he concludes, “elusively insubstantial – notoriously less stable 
and less inherent than the natures of other things” (p. 67).  Insofar as this is the case, 
that is how “sincerity itself is bullshit” (ibid.). 
But this review is now at least a fifth as long as Frankfurt’s marvellous book is, 
and I did promise to respect its brevity by trying to be similarly succinct. 
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